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The field of blood banking is grappling with a new 
facet of regulation and risk. Long accustomed to 
regulations governing the safety and efficacy of blood 
products, blood bankers are now anticipating federal 
regulations on occupational safety. Yet despite all 
attempts to reduce occupational safety risks-through 
appropriate procedures introduced by management, 
diligent efforts by employees, and oversight activities 
by regulatory agencies-safety remains an elusive 
quality Just as a truly risk-free society is not obtainable, 
workplace safety can never be absolute. What then are 
the goals of occupational safety programs? How should 
risks be managed in blood banking environments? 
This review will attempt to define reasonable goals 
for worker safety in blood banking. There are different 
perspectives that must be considered in defining the 
requirements for safety. The risk of an environment 
must be understood and accepted by those working 
in it. In reviewing these concepts, readers will be able 
to assess what “safety” means to them in their 
environment and subsequently take appropriate 
measures to satisfy their own safety requirements and 
those of regulatory agencies. 
The definition of safety 
A theoretical discussion in personal terms 
The concept of safety involves intangible assurances 
and tangible outcomes. How “safe” an activity must 
be is established by one’s own needs in the context 
of a particular situation. A person enrolling in jump 
school must recognize that the parachute will open 
on a certain proportion of jumps. If the student is 
unwilling to accept the risk that the parachute will fail 
to deploy occasionally, the student will never leave the 
airplane door. 
Putting aside inaccurate perceptions of the risks 
involved, the benefits to be gained from an activity 
must ultimately outweigh the risks before a person will 
engage in the activity. When a person seeks out an 
activity, such as skydiving, the participant clearly 
derives some benefit, even if only psychological, from 
participation. A person deriving high benefit from an 
activity may be able to accept higher risks and still 
make his own risk/benefit equation tally to the positive 
side. If an individual perceives little benefit from 
participation in an activity, less risk will be assumed 
before the activity will be abandoned. Personal motiva- 
tion must also be recognized: one may tend to 
minimize risks of an activity that one wishes to per- 
form but maximize the risks of activities one really 
wishes to avoid. 
Practical considerations 
Clearly, “safety” means different things to different 
people. In today’s society, a common approach to safe- 
ty is couched in absolute terms: If an untoward event 
can happen, the activity is unsafe. Given recent 
increases in concern over avoiding infection with the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), laboratory 
workers today seek absolute guarantees that HIV will 
have no chance of infecting them. 
This concept of absolute safety prevalent in society 
today’ has become mirrored in statutes, regulations, 
and societal consciousness. While recreational or 
nonessential activities are not closely regulated (eg, one 
does not need a license to fly a hang-glider), occupa- 
tional and other activities in which one has limited 
choices are much more closely regulated in an attempt 
to create an environment that has minimal risk. sup(2) 
Although we are free to choose a profession, society 
attempts to codify risk reduction toward the end of 
eliminating, or at least defining and controlling, risks 
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that may be encountered in the workplace. 
The concept of absolute safety and the fear of 
transmission of an incurable disease, AIDS, are redefin- 
ing safety in the clinical laboratory. Although clinical 
laboratory workers had higher rates of tuberculosis, 
diarrhea, and possibly hepatitis and shigellosis prior 
to implementation of now-common safety precau- 
tions, sup(3-6) clinical laboratories are not generally 
regarded as "unsafe" places to work today. The pro- 
portion of persons with AIDS who were health care 
workers is the same as the proportion of the workforce 
that is employed in health care. sup(7) However, the 
laboratory is an environment where one may come 
into contact with blood that may contain an infectious 
agent, sup(8) and transmission of HIV from a concentrated 
culture has occurred despite apparent observance of 
applicable safety precautions. sup(9) It is also known that 
15-20 percent of some laboratory workers have 
serologic evidence of past hepatitis B infection, sup(10,11) far 
above the prevalence in the U. S. population of approx- 
imately 2-3 percent. sup(12) What are the risks of transmis- 
sion of HIV in the clinical laboratory, and bow can 
they he eliminated or controlled? 
HIV is transmitted either through sexual contact or 
parenteral exposure to blood or other tissues or fluids 
containing the virus. These modes of H N  spread, long 
appreciated for the hepatitis B virus (HBV), do not 
seem to pose strong threats to the safety of health care 
workers. HBV transmission occurs with much higher 
efficiency than transmission of HN. For example, 6-30 
percent of individuals inadvertently stuck with a 
needle contaminated with HBV become infected. sup(13,14) 
In contrast, studies of health care workers parenterally 
exposed to HIV have reported seroconversion rates of 
1 percent or less. sup(9,15-17) The oft-cited case of a 
needlestick injury of a nurse with a needle con- 
taminated with the blood of a patient who had AIDS 
and was an HBV carrier is illustrative: the nurse 
developed hepatitis hut did not become seropositive 
for HIV antibodies. sup(18) Prior to June 1987, six cases had 
been reported in which cutaneous contact with blood 
from individuals with AIDS had resulted in seroconver- 
sion of a care giver. The exposures in these cases had 
generally been prolonged and had offered the infected 
blood access to the host's body through skin that was 
not intact. 
The report of three health care workers who 
seroconverted for HIV after short exposure to infected 
blood through skin with only (apparently) minor 
abnormalities sup(19) increased the level of concern that 
HIV transmission was a potential worthy of note in 
laboratories. Two additional factors led government, 
industry, and workers' representatives to reassess safety 
measures for laboratory workers. Two of the 
individuals whose blood caused these infections were 
not known at the time of the exposure to be HIV 
positive. Furthermore, increased concern was being 
expressed by some public officials that HIV was 
spreading quickly to individuals who would not be 
able to recognize that they had been placed at risk of 
HIV transmission. 
Initial recognition in the 1960s and 1970s of HBV 
transmission as a laboratory hazard sup(20,21) led to 
infection-control measures directed at isolation and 
special handling of high-risk samples. sup(22) Until even 
recently, this approach had been endorsed by govern- 
mental agencies. sup(23) Numerous warning tags, labels, and 
alert systems have been devised in an attempt to warn 
lab workers and other health care providers that 
specimens from a particular patient represented a risk 
of infection. Given the low prevalence in the western 
world of HBV, and the introduction of standard lab 
safety practices such as a prohibition on eating and 
mouth pipeting in the laboratory and recommenda- 
tions that hands be washed before eating, these precau- 
tions seemed reasonable in that they focused atten- 
tion on those samples with significant potential for 
infection. sup(24) However, this approach has not been 
entirely successful: 12,000 cases of occupationally ac- 
quired HBV infection occur annually in this country 
among health care workers. sup(25) There are several 
reasons for this continued transmission of HBV to 
laboratory workers. First, basic safety precautions were 
not always followed. Second, specimens and patients 
were not always appropriately labeled. (750,000 
Americans are HBV carriers and 1 percent of admis- 
sions may be HBV carriers. sup(23) Thus, there remained 
a great potential for a health care worker to he exposed 
unknowingly to an infective specimen. sup(16,26,27) 
The lab precautions used over the last decade were 
developed in response to HBV as the primary infec- 
tious agent of concern to blood bankers. Recognition 
of the potential transmissibility of HIV in laboratory 
situations has changed some of the variables in the 
equation of safety. Although present in blood at a far 
lower concentration than HBV and having an infec- 
tion efficiency far below that of HBV,I3J4 HIV infec- 
tion appears much more likely to cause clinical 
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disease. sup(28) Although the prevalence of hepatitis B sur- 
face antigen is ten times the seropositivity rate of HIV 
in the population of the United States, the crisis of HIV 
infection, and the real although extremely low 
possibility of HIV transmission to health care 
workers sup(9,17) has spurred the introduction of a new 
approach to protecting laboratory and other health c m  
workers. 
Safety Precautions 
Lab safety standards today ‘are intended to prevent 
transmission of all infectious agents from samples 
known to be infectious and those not suspected of har- 
boring a transmissible agent. Termed “universal precau- 
tions,” these standards regard every patient and 
specimen as potentially infectious. sup(7,29) As HBV and 
HIV hold the greatest potential for morbidity after 
infection among agents likely to be encountered in 
laboratories (other than microbiology labs) in this 
country, safety procedures have been designed to 
interrupt their transmission. sup(30,31) When other agents 
are of concern, application of the same principle 
would require use of precautions designed to safeguard 
against the spread of these agents with all 
specimens.’* The alternative, testing all samples or 
patients for HIV, for example, would be impractical, 
pose substantial ethical problems, and still permit an 
unknown exposure to many health care workers. sup(7,29) 
Knowledge of the potential routes of transmission 
of agents, especially HBV and HIV, thus becomes 
critical. Although all body fluids and tissues are now 
regarded a potentially infective, and HIV has been 
isolated from blood, semen, vaginal secretions, saliva, 
tears, breast milk, cerebrospinal fluid, amniotic fluid, 
and urine, the concentrations of virus found in some 
of these fluids may be below that required for infec- 
tivity. sup(7) The Joint Advisory Notice from the Depart- 
ments of Iabor and Health and Human Services recom- 
mends taking into account these and other variables 
when assessing exposure risk. sup(25) In the case of HIV, 
direct introduction inside the body appears to be 
necessary for infection, and only blood, semen, vaginal 
secretions, and breast mik have been implicated in HIV 
transmission. sup(8) Cutaneous contact with unbroken, 
undamaged skin does not appear to be a likely 
transmission route. Similarly, aerosols do not appear 
to represent a risk of transmission of HIV, based on 
the reported inability to transmit aerosolized HBV to 
gibbons. sup(33) This requirement for parenteral exposure 
for HIV transmission may be reflected in the lack of 
HIV seroconversions among health care workers with 
nonpercutaneous exposures, whereas 0.9 percent of 
workers with percutaneous or mucosal exposures have 
seroconverted. 13 Nevertheless, the approach taken by 
federal regulatory agencies and the guidelines proposed 
by the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory 
Standards (NCCLS) sup(34) would indicate that all routes of 
exposure should be avoided-even if these routes do 
not appear very effective in causing infection- 
because of the possibility of transmission and the dire 
consequences of infection. 
What does this mean in practical terms? In simple 
and summary form: Avoid coming in physical contact 
with a fluid or tissue that may contain an infectious 
agent. The application of this recommendation 
becomes universal under current concepts, as all 
human fluids and tissues, except intact skin, are 
assumed to be infectious. Given the nature of the 
infectious agents at risk for transmission, all human 
blood would be considered as requiring biosafety level 
2 precautions to avoid exposure. sup(35) 
The means by which this contact is to be avoided 
will vary by the function being performed. In most 
tasks, however, barrier protection of hands is critical 
in interrupting transmission. sup(36) For personnel working 
with donors, gloves or equivalent protection should 
be worn during functions that may be anticipated to 
result in contact with blood, such as collection and 
handling of the predonation blood sample, venipunc- 
ture, and needle withdrawal. While the need and 
advisability of glove usage during normal donor 
phleboromy continues to be debated, there is consen- 
sus that gloves are necessary if the phlebotomist’s skin 
is not unbroken. In the laboratory, the production 
of components may result in leakage of segments; 
therefore, gloves should be worn. Some procedures, 
such as the segmenting of tubing, do not routinely 
cause direct exposure but, with some regularity, do 
result in an unavoidable spillage or splattering. For pro- 
cesses such as this, additional appropriate protective 
gear, such as safety glasses or eye or face shields, should 
be worn. Alternatively, a shield may be installed on 
the device, or some other barrier may be erected to 
obviate the necessity of additional protective gear. 
Some type of protective garment should also be 
worn when working in a laboratory or collection site. 
This may be a buttoned, long-sleeve lab coat, overalls, 
or a uniform. A garment worn by a worker should pre- 
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vent direct contact with blood if a spill or splatter 
occurs. The garment could be removed to avoid con- 
tact through soaking. For other activities not 
commonly performed in blood banking, the garment 
may need to be waterproof, such as a plastic apron 
being worn over a gown. 
Although transmission through breaks in skin and 
mucous membranes is important, one of the greatest 
risks of transmission of an infectious agent to health 
care workers is through skin puncture with a con- 
taminated sharp object. Needlestick injuries are the 
most common of occupational injuries in health care 
and among the most effective in allowing a virus 
parenteral access. Needlesticks account for 80 percent 
of exposure among health care workers being tested 
for HIV exposure. sup(13,37) Data from the experience of the 
American Red Cross suggest that approximately 3,000 
incidences of needle-related injuries occur during 
the processing and phlebotomy of 12 million U.S. 
volunteer whole blood donors annually. Regardless of 
all other safety precautions utilized, it is essential that 
extreme diligence is observed when handling needles 
and other sharp objects. Plastic or latex gloves, even 
in multiple layers, will not protect a worker from this 
form of injury. Needle capping and destruction have 
been abandoned, but in blood banking, there continues 
to be a need to handle needles after their removal from 
a donor’s vein. The recent development of guards for 
needles that will allow the collection of pilot tubes 
after phlebotomy and that provide a safe and secure 
protective housing for their disposal will greatly reduce 
risks of needlestick injury in donor phlebotomy. 
The clean-up of spills always presents a risk of direct 
exposure. Gloves should always be worn during the 
clean-up of spills, and special care should be exercis- 
ed to avoid unexpected exposure. In addition, broken 
glass or other sharp objects may increase the poten- 
tial for transmission of an infectious agent in this situa- 
tion. Disinfection routines should take into account 
the amount of infectious material that could not be 
physically removed and the porosity of the surface. 
Contact for 20 minutes with household bleach diluted 
1:10-1:100 is sufficient to inactivate HIV and HBV sup(34,38) 
Blood bankers working in laboratories have asked 
numerous questions about aerosols. How are they 
created and are they dangerous? True aerosols- 
microscopic droplets ( <= 5 microns) suspended in air 
-are not likely to be produced in blood bank 
laboratories. As mentioned earlier. aerosols do not 
appear to be viable vectors of HBV transmission. 
However, splattering and small, undetected splashes 
may be the mode of transmission in many cases of 
laboratory-acquired infections. sup(39) The splattering that 
may occur when removing the tops of evacuated pilot 
tubes may be reduced by covering the tops with a 
gauze or opening the tubes only after centrifugation. 
Blood bank centrifuges that contain open tubes do not 
obtain rotational velocities likely to produce aerosols. 
Although small droplets may be produced when a 
plastic bag or glass tube breaks in a centrifuge, these 
are confined within most centrifuge housings and can 
be allowed to settle before cleaning. Blending, 
sonicating, and vigorous mixing of samples, however, 
should be performed in a biological safety cabinet.7 
Thus, at present, current recommendations would not 
seem to suggest that special precautions need to be 
taken when centrifuging blood bags or specimens. 
The lack of immediately available handwashing 
facilities on mobile blood drives presents a problem. 
It is recommended that hands be washed with soap 
and water whenever gloves are removed and/or hands 
or gloves are soiled. Use of common towelettes has 
not been recommended because of inadequate cleans- 
ing action. 34 Other alternatives might include a spray 
bottle filled with soap and another filled with rinse 
water or a towelette saturated with a topical 
disinfectant. 
Care should also be taken in an environment in 
which both gloves and ungloved hands are present. 
Items that might be handled both ways, such as 
telephones, keyboards, records, writing implements, 
doorknobs or faucets, could become contaminated and 
present a theoretical exposure risk through an un- 
gloved hand. sup(36,40,41) Although environmental con- 
tamination has never resulted in HIV transmission, it 
may be of more concern in the case of HBV. sup(7,31) One 
approach to this problem is mechanical, such as 
installing foot pedal or elbow-activated sinks and foot 
pedal phones. A simpler approach is to standardize 
technique and classify items as “clean” or “dirty.” 
Because of communications with representatives of 
the blood banking industry, federal agencies propos- 
ing workplace regulations understand that the risk of 
blood from a volunteer donor containing HIV or HBV 
is much less than when the blood originates from a 
patient. sup(14) This decreased risk is attributable to the 
testing of previous donations, health history 
assessments, and similar procedures. However, approx- 
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imately 1-2 of every 10,000 individuals completing 
the donation process have been exposed to HIV, and 
10-50 times that proportion are positive for hepatitis 
B surface antigen. Thus, although handling only blood 
from volunteer donors may entail a much smaller 
likelihood of encountering infectious blood than 
handling patient specimens, this risk of exposure is 
not zero. Appropriate safety precautions must be taken, 
but the exact stipulations of federally required or 
recommended safety procedures are still under 
development. 
Handwashing and glove use appear to present the 
greatest difficulties for blood bankers. Precisely follow- 
ing the recommendations for patient care of the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) sup(7) would require a 
phlebotomist to change gloves between contact with 
each donor. As most mobile blood drives have 
phlebotomists working with three or four donors at 
one time, innumerable glove changes would be 
required-with handwashing accompanying each. On 
the other hand, the Joint Advisory Notice has stated 
that barrier protection, such as glove use, is necessary, 
but does not require the changing of gloves other than 
to maintain worker protection. sup(25) This apparent 
discrepancy can be resolved by recognizing that the 
donation process is already safe. Transmission of an 
infection from one donor to another apparently does 
not need to be addressed, except perhaps in the 
perceptions of donors. Consequently, appropriate use 
of barrier precautions for donor phlebotomists would 
not require changing gloves unless soiled. 
These comments, and any listing of safety pro- 
cedures, can never encompass appropriate safety 
techniques for all tasks. When evaluating the poten- 
tial for exposure in a task, what level of risk should 
cause a modification of the procedure or the institu- 
tion of an additional safety precaution? This question 
cannot be answered precisely, but may be addressed 
from two vantage points. One is a cost/benefit 
approach. Although this concept may make sense on 
an overall perspective, it is not always acceptable to 
those taking the risk, regulatory agencies, and juries. 
The other approach is one of common sense. What 
is reasonable to one person may not be regarded as 
such by another. However, if an activity may be fore- 
seen to present a substantial safety risk to those involv- 
ed, appropriate precautions should be taken. Factors 
that should be taken into account when evaluating risks 
include: 
The type and volume of specimen to be encountered 
The likelihood of the specimen containing infectious 
agents (given the assumption that the person from 
which it came was infectious) and their 
concentration 
The probability and predictability of direct contact 
occurring 
The probable route of exposure and the transmis- 
sion efficiency of the agent(s) in question via this 
route. 
While absolute guidelines are not possible in such 
an evaluation, thoughtful consideration of the risks- 
and documentation of these evaluations—should result 
in procedures that most would regard as “reasonable.” 
Recognition that nothing is absolute-and that even 
stringent decontamination procedures must be viewed 
in terms of probabiIities sup(38,44)—may provide assistance 
in guiding the process. 
Administrative Requirements 
The administrative requirements regarding worker 
safety must also be mentioned. The above discussion 
used terms such as “recommendations” and “should.” 
Is this truly advice or are these preventive actions man- 
datory? Although the scientific basis for some of the 
recommendations made here or in other documents 
may be less than conclusive, it would appear that 
governmental recommendations will be followed with 
regulations and that “should” is to be interpreted as 
“must.” There are several reasons for this. The prestige 
of the Centers for Disease Control in matters relating 
to infection control and the credibility of NCCLS 
indicates that their suggestions must be taken very 
seriously. Moreover, the special relationships blood col- 
lecting agencies attempt to cultivate with volunteer 
donors and the community at large require that they 
maintain the highest standards of safety in all aspects 
of their operation. Thus, it would be prudent to regard 
these recommendations carefully in order to maintain 
the public’s trust and confidence in this aspect of the 
operation, as a reflection of the agency’s total 
commitment to quality and safety. 
The involvement of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) in laboratory safety is 
another important consideration. OSHA has begun the 
administrative rule-making process to codify the 
recommendations of the CDC and the Joint Advisory 
Notice5 into federal regulations. sup(45) In the interim, 
OSHA intends to enforce the intent of these recom- 
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mendations for safe practices through what is known 
as the ‘‘general duty” clause of the OSHA statute. sup(45) 
This section of the law requires employers to “pro- 
vide a work environment that is free from recognized 
hazards that (may). . . cause death or serious physical 
harm. . . ,”46 In addition, OSHA issued similar 
guidelines in 1983 pertaining to glove protection for 
exposure to samples possibly containing HBV. sup(23) These 
may be used in a regulatory fashion to enforce the pro- 
visions of the CDC recommendations. sup(47) 
These recommendations and advisory notices go 
beyond detailing concepts of safe practices. They also 
include procedures for education, record keeping, 
incident recording, and employee counseling. 
Establishment of procedures in concordance with the 
recommendations is not sufficient to satisfy OSHA 
regulations. Not only must employees receive train- 
ing regarding proper procedures, they must be required 
to follow them under supervision and must be 
disciplined when found to be deviating from the pro- 
cedures in an unsafe manner. Management personnel 
are advised to review appropriate OSHA and CDC 
documents to ensure that the laboratory’s entire safety 
system, not just the recommended procedures, con- 
form to these expectations. 
Steps to Safety 
Some thoughts on implementation 
Reviewing current safety protocols-or revamping 
them entirely-can be a major undertaking, possibly 
too overwhelming to know where to begin. A few 
pointers are offered to initiate the process. 
To begin, the tasks that must be performed should 
be analyzed to determine the source of potential risks. 
This implies a step-by-step review of all procedures per- 
formed, preferably by supervisory and line personnel 
working together to identify where and how exposure 
might take place. Once functions that represent poten- 
tial risk have been identified, each should either be 
modified or a protective measure initiated and entered 
into the standard operating procedure. Removal of the 
potentially dangerous function or changing the equip- 
ment or procedure to remove or reduce the risk of 
exposure are obviously preferred approaches. Although 
inactivation of viruses before analysis is sometimes 
feasible, sup(15) the instability of certain analytes important 
in blood banking, especially IgM antibodies, would 
preclude thermal inactivation steps. sup(48) If the necessary 
degree of safety cannot be achieved in a reasonable 
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manner by procedural or equipment alterations, pro- 
tective measures such as barrier precautions must 
be initiated. 
The Joint Advisory Notice sup(25) recommends classify- 
ing all tasks into one of three categories: 
Category I: Tasks that involve potential exposure and 
that require protective equipment. 
Category 11: Tasks that do not involve exposure but 
exposure may occur because of perfor- 
mance of unanticipated Category I tasks. 
Category III: Tasks that do not involve potential 
exposure. In this category, it is presumed 
that persons performing these tasks are 
not required as a part of their employ- 
ment to perform Category I tasks. 
This codification can take place using the guidelines 
mentioned above for evaluating exposure risks. 
Through this approach, management can help 
employees follow safety protocols. The standard 
operating procedure for each task will include 
appropriate safety precautions. Staff will be educated 
and trained in these safety precautions. The situations 
in which precautions must be taken will be delineated, 
and staff will know when certain safety precautions 
must be utilized. This should limit the need for 
administrative oversight. 
Prevention is a key in safety, but despite diligent 
efforts by all involved, occasional mishaps may occur. 
Planning ahead to thwart the effects of an exposure 
in an individual is an important second line of defense. 
Where vaccination is available, such as for hepatitis 
B, this should be seriously considered by all employees 
at potential risk for exposure. Management should sup- 
port vaccination and other prophylaxis programs 
through visibility, accessibility, and financial sup- 
port. sup(25) Although postexposure prophylaxis is often 
effective for hepatitis B, unknown exposure and in- 
adequate postexposure prophylaxis may result in a 
serious disease that could have been avoided. Pro- 
cedures for offering testing and counseling to workers 
should also be developed. 
Some Final Thoughts 
Is safety too expensive? Will safety procedures that 
are currently being “recommended” cost too much 
time, money, or donor support? What have we 
accomplished with these safety programs? The 
attempted introduction of a new laboratory safety code 
in Great Britain a decade ago sup(49) brought an avalanche 
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of opposition because of high costs and “impractical” 
requirements. sup(50) What role should blood bankers play 
in providing information, support, and direction to the 
regulatory agencies now developing safety regulations 
in this country? 
It may be asserted that safety, like quality, is free. sup(51) 
The real costs occur when safety is not achieved. 
When safe procedures are followed, an intangible good 
is derived by all affected. When an accident occurs, 
real expenses may mount quickly in terms of lost pro- 
ducts, decreased worker morale, and productivity and 
injury awards. sup(52) 
A work environment free of unnecessary risk is a 
right of employees. By carefully defining the mean- 
ing of safety, thoroughly considering the risks involved, 
and applying societal and personal concepts of safety, 
blood bankers can make important contributions to 
the provision of safe workplaces. 
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